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I. INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate (“the Mandate”)
requires employers to provide insurance coverage of contraceptive methods
to employees at no cost.1 The Act demonstrates Congress’ growing
recognition of the correlation between a woman’s reproductive anatomy
and her equal participation in both society and the economy. 2 Although
publicized as a “comprehensive” plan, the Mandate fails to provide
contraception coverage to all women.3 The Mandate’s failure to eliminate
the burdens and barriers to contraception access is attributed to several
factors, such as exemptions in the Act’s language and non-compliance on
the part of insurance companies.4
The Mandate contains several
exemptions that create intentional, albeit necessary, barriers to
contraception access; however,5 these barriers have been permitted on
constitutional grounds.6 Along with intentional barriers, the Mandate has
created unintentional barriers that make it ineffective at providing coverage
and equality for women.7
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court established the right to privacy is

1. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)
(2012).
2. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
846 (1992) (upholding a woman’s right to receive an abortion).
3. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1143 (10th Cir.
2013) (stating the Mandate does not provide coverage for private employers with
grandfathered plans, for employers with fewer than fifty employees, and for religious
employers).
4. See id. (detailing the exemptions contained in the Mandate that excuse certain
employers from complying with the provision).
5. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)(4) (2016); The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(a) (West 1997) (protecting the free exercise
of religion, which provided the basis for the religious exemption in the Mandate).
6. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014)
(discussing the religious exemption for for-profit corporations).
7. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124 (stating that over 100 million people
remain uncovered by the Mandate); see also Committee Opinion No. 615: Access to
Contraception, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Jan. 2015),
https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-forUnderserved-Women/co615.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20160722T1016341074
[hereinafter
Access to Contraception] (describing the importance and difficulties of access to
contraception).
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fundamental; therefore, the right cannot be infringed upon unless the
government can show the intrusion served a narrowly tailored and
compelling state interest.8 The Court also found that the right to privacy
encompassed the right to marital privacy, including the constitutional right
to decide whether or not to have children.9 Therefore, as contraception
affects the right to make this decision, the Court found contraception to be
a constitutional right.10 Although the Mandate has succeeded in lowering
the nationwide cost of contraception, barriers to contraceptive access still
exist.11 These barriers have placed huge burdens on women in the United
States, violating their constitutional right to privacy.12
This Comment argues that the Mandate violates the constitutional right
to privacy, and therefore a stronger contraception mandate is necessary. In
addition, this Comment asserts that states must enact more comprehensive
contraceptive plans, using Maryland’s Contraceptive Equity Act of 2016 as
the best example of such a plan.13 Part II of this Comment provides a
history of the constitutional right to privacy and the legislation surrounding
an individual’s right to contraceptive accessibility.14 Part III argues that the
Mandate contains unlawful barriers to contraception access and is
unconstitutional under the right to privacy.15 Additionally, Part III
contends that the Maryland Contraceptive Equity Act provides the most
comprehensive contraception coverage and is a constitutional alternative to
the Mandate.16 Part IV concludes that because the Maryland Contraceptive
Equity Act fills the gaps left by the Mandate it should be a model for other

8. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (concluding fundamental rights
must be free from government intrusion).
9. See id. at 153.
10. See id. at 154.
11. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124 (stating that at least 50 million people do
not have coverage due to exempt health plans).
12. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
872 (1992) (clarifying that health regulations that have the purpose or effect of a
substantial obstacle to a woman’s reproductive life impose undue burdens on that right
and are unconstitutional).
13. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §
15-826.1 (2016).
14. See infra Part II (describing the history and enactment of Maryland’s
Contraceptive Equity Act of 2016 to illustrate its potential success).
15. See infra Part III (explaining that barriers from the Mandate create substantial
burdens on women’s access to birth control).
16. See infra Part III (arguing that the Maryland Contraceptive Equity Act provide
coverage which eliminates the barriers the Act’s religious exemption will survive
judicial scrutiny).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

3

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4

214

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 25:2

states to create similar contraceptive coverage.17
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The Constitution does not provide an explicit right to privacy; however,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the Bill of Rights contains penumbras that
establish such a right.18 Existing within the peripheral of the First, Third,
Fourth and Ninth Amendments, the right to privacy protects each
individual’s authority to make decisions regarding her body and private life
absent government intrusion.19 Since Justice Brandeis described this right
as the “right to be let alone,” it has been interpreted by the Courts and has
taken many forms, such as the right to protections against wire-tapping, the
right to view pornography in one’s home, and the right to contraception.20
Although comprehensive in scope, the right to privacy has been narrowly
applied to government intrusions related to family, marriage, motherhood,
procreation, and child-rearing.21
1.

Right to Privacy as a Fundamental Right

The controversial case Roe v. Wade cemented the constitutionality of the
right to privacy.22 Although the Court acknowledged that some intrusive
government regulations are necessary and appropriate under certain
17. See infra Part IV (concluding that the Affordable Care Act’s contraception
mandate fails to protect a women’s right to privacy and states need to enact more
comprehensive contraception coverage mandates).
18. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (finding a right to
privacy within the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution).
19. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (upholding an individual’s
freedom to associate and privacy in one’s association under the First Amendment’s
right of assembly); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (describing the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure as a “protection(s)
against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life”).
20. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (finding the right to privacy
includes intellectual and emotional needs, including an individual’s decision to watch
pornography); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (concluding wiretapping is an invasion of the right to privacy).
21. See e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (motherhood);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944) (family); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(procreation); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (child-rearing).
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (protecting the right to privacy
from government intrusion through strict judicial scrutiny).
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circumstances, the Court found that the right to privacy was fundamental.23
The Court recognized that the right to privacy was not absolute and must
be weighed against important state interests.24 Any regulation that may
impede on the right to privacy must be narrowly tailored to express only
the legitimate state interest involved.25 For example, the Court in Roe v.
Wade concluded that a Texas statute criminalizing abortions failed to
demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify infringement upon an
individual’s right to privacy.26 In this case, the Court established a
temporarily expansive constitutional right to abortion.27
2.

The Right to Marital Privacy and Contraception

A significant extension of the right to privacy is the right to
contraception, established by the Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut.28 In Griswold, the Court upheld the right to marital privacy
when it struck down a statute criminalizing the use, distribution, and
recommendation of the use of contraceptives.29 Justice Douglas reasoned
that it would be “repulsive” to permit police officers to enter the private
bedrooms of couples to look for evidence of contraceptive use.30 The
Court effectively established a constitutional right for married couples to
23. See id. at 154 (holding that government interference may be justified when a
“state’s interests as to protection of health, medical standards and prenatal life, become
dominant”).
24. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); cf. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (holding any classification penalizing the
exercise of right of interstate travel is unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling
government interest).
25. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see also Baird, 405
U.S. at 463-64 (White, J., concurring) (finding a regulation requiring a prescription to
obtain dangerous contraceptive material was not unnecessarily broad, and therefore
constitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis).
26. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (holding that the state’s interest in in protecting
health and potential life did not justify broad limitations on a woman’s ability to
receive an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy).
27. But see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 873-74 (1992) (weakening the constitutional right to choose abortion by replacing
strict scrutiny test with an undue burden test, which invalidates a statute if it is too
burdensome on a fundamental right).
28. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (finding a law that forbids contraceptives an
unconstitutional intrusion on martial privacy).
29. See id. (concluding that a law criminalizing contraceptive use instead of
regulating manufacture or sale, achieves goals by “having a maximum destructive
impact upon that relationship”).
30. See id. at 486 (ruling that a law regulating contraception is not only a violation
of the Constitution, but also a threat to the privacy inherent in marital relationships).
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use contraception.31 Applying a strict-scrutiny test, the Court decided the
regulation banning contraceptive use achieved its purpose by “means
having a maximum destructive impact upon a marital relationship.”32 The
regulation failed to be narrowly applied and was therefore an infringement
on the right to privacy.33
Following Griswold, women’s rights were expanded further by
Eisenstadt v. Baird, which extended the right to contraception to single
individuals.34 The Court found no rational basis to ban the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons but not married couples.35 The Court
further expanded contraceptive rights in Carey v. Population Services
International, holding that strict scrutiny must also be applied to state
regulations that burden an individual’s right to contraception by
substantially limiting an individual’s ability to actually exercise that right.36
B. The Importance of Contraception Access
Unplanned pregnancy remains one of the biggest public health problems
in our country today.37 Approximately half of all pregnancies are
unplanned or unwanted, with that number steadily increasing since 2006.38
Unplanned pregnancies come with a multitude of issues that can have
negative effects on the mother, the child, and society.39 Unplanned

31. See id.
32. See id. at 485 (establishing that legislation regulating privacy interests, such as

contraception, must pass a strict-scrutiny analysis, meaning the legislation must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest by the least restrictive
means).
33. See id. (explaining regulations that are unnecessarily broad are an invasion of
protected freedoms).
34. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (finding that no ground
exists for according different treatment to married and unmarried persons regarding
contraceptives).
35. See id. at 448 (acknowledging the widespread availability of contraceptives to
all persons, unmarried and married, and applying a rational basis test under the Equal
Protection Clause, rather than a strict-scrutiny analysis under the Due Process Clause).
36. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (expanding
upon the Griswold strict-scrutiny test).
37. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229,
261-62 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (concluding that the government sought to expand
contraceptive access to assist in reducing unintended pregnancies); see also Unintended
Pregnancy Prevention, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/unintendedpregnancy/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2016)
[hereinafter CDC].
38. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261-62 (finding that the rate of unplanned
pregnancies increased from forty-eight percent to fifty percent since 2006).
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pregnancies can result in delayed prenatal care, premature birth, and
negative physical and mental health effects for both the children and the
mother.40
The Center for Disease Control and Protection states that the main cause
of unintended pregnancies is not using contraception, or using it
inconsistently or incorrectly.41 Women who do not use contraception or
use it inconsistently or incorrectly account for around ninety-six percent of
Conversely, those women who use
unintended pregnancies.42
contraceptives consistently and correctly account for less than five percent
of unintended pregnancies.43 The most effective way to prevent unintended
pregnancy is to improve access to consistent, effective, and affordable
contraception.44
By preventing unintended pregnancies, contraception plays a major role
in improving public health and wellbeing, reducing global maternal
mortality, encouraging female engagement in the work force, and allowing
women more economic independence.45 However, cost and access remain
major barriers to contraception.46 The Institute of Medicine notes that even
small increases in cost reduce the use of contraception and other
preventative services.47 For instance, a national survey from 2004 of
women ages eighteen to forty-four who were using reversible contraception
found that “[w]omen citing cost concerns were twice as likely as other
39. See id. at 262 (including dangerous pregnancy complications, delayed prenatal
care or premature birth, future infertility, and mental health issues once the child is
born); see also Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed.
Reg. 8,725, 8,727 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
40. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 262 (listing depression, anxiety, and domestic
violence as consequences of unplanned pregnancies).
41. See CDC, supra note 37; see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 262 (stating that
couples using no method of contraception have an eight-five percent chance of an
unintended pregnancy within twelve months).
42. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 262 (recognizing that stronger contraception
access will decrease unwanted pregnancies).
43. See id. at 261-62 (proving that contraception access plays a major role in
preventing unintended pregnancies).
44. See Access to Contraception, supra note 7 (stating that universal coverage of
contraceptives is cost-effective and assists in reducing unintended pregnancy and
abortion rates).
45. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 259-63.
46. See id. at 260 (describing that people are hindered from preventative steps
because costs and efforts are “immediate”); see also Access to Contraception, supra
note 7.
47. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261 (observing that high costs of contraception
cause women to forego preventative care altogether).
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women to rely on condoms or less effective methods like withdrawal or
periodic abstinence.”48 In addition, a 2009 study found that economic
hardships, such as the 2008 recession, significantly affect contraception use
and family planning.49 The study of low- and middle-income sexually
active women reported that in 2009, 34% said they had a harder time
paying for birth control, 30% had put off a gynecological or birth control
visit to save money, and 25% of pill users saved money through
inconsistent use.50 Further, the methods that are most effective are often
only available with a prescription or administered by a medical
professional, which often come with higher costs.51 However, the no-cost
coverage of contraceptive methods could greatly increase contraception use
and decrease unintended pregnancies, therefore increasing public health.52
C. The Affordable Care Act Contraception Mandate
One of the more criticized legislation is the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
also known as “Obamacare.”53 Formally known as The Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, the “comprehensive” plan is known as President
Obama’s crowning achievement, despite intense criticism from Republican
leaders.54 Since the ACA was signed into law, over half of the states have
filed lawsuits questioning its constitutionality.55 The Mandate is a
provision of the ACA that has received continued disapproval.56 The
Mandate requires health insurance companies to provide all women with
access to contraceptives, sterilization, and preventative services.57
48. Testimony Submitted to Committee on Preventive Services for Women,
Institute
of
Medicine
8
(Guttmacher
Inst.,
Jan.
12,
2011),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/CPSW-testimony.pdf (finding
that cost plays a key role in the use and method of contraceptives).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261 (finding that barriers such as needing a
prescription from a medical professional deter women from obtaining contraception).
52. See id.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2016).
54. See House v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (2015) (consolidating challenges
to the insurance subsidies under the ACA brought by thirty-eight Republican
lawmakers).
55. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012)
(discussing lawsuits filed by twenty-six states challenging the constitutionality of the
ACA because of the barriers that impede the access to contraceptives).
56. See § 300gg-13(a)(4); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d
1114, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) (challenging the Mandate’s constitutionality).
57. See § 300gg-13(a)(4); see also Group Health Plans and Health Insurance
Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and
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Barriers to Contraception Access Under the Mandate

Despite its early success, the Mandate has received criticism since its
inception, most notably from religions organizations.58 The Obama
Administration attempted to combat the religious opposition by making a
minor concession in the form of a religious exemption, which did little to
fix the resistance.59 The Mandate exempted religious employers, such as
churches, houses of worship, and non-profit religious organizations from
providing health care plans that cover contraception at no cost.60 The
exemption allows certain religious employers to give notice of their beliefs
to their insurance provider.61 Then the insurance company or the
government, rather than the religious employer, is required to cover the
costs of contraceptives.62 This accommodation allowed the government to
respect religious beliefs, while still providing women with access to
contraceptives.63
The Mandate’s religious exemption was eventually expanded to exempt
closely held for-profit entities with a religious objection to providing
coverage.64 This exemption, combined with those employers that are
exempt under grandfathered plans, places many women at a disadvantage
Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725, 8,726 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 147) (providing mammograms and prenatal care with no consumer cost
sharing).
58. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado v.
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022, 1229 (2014) (challenging the Mandate’s religious
exemption); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123; Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
59. See generally Little Sisters of the Poor, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (demonstrating that
organizations continue to file lawsuits against the Mandate and its religious exemption
despite extension of the Mandate’s exemption to for-profit corporations).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2016); see also Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at
1123 (describing the exemptions from the Mandate contraceptive-coverage
requirement).
61. See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147, 156)
(providing religious employers with an accommodation to protect the employers from
government infringement upon their religious beliefs).
62. See id. (allowing women to still receive contraception free of cost, despite their
employer’s exemption serves the government’s interests while protecting individuals’
and organizations’ religious beliefs).
63. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (ruling that the accommodation for
women meets both goals of protecting religious freedom while also ensuring women
obtain contraceptives, resulting in an acceptable constitutional balance).
64. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014)
(defining “closely-held” as corporations in which fewer than five people own more
than half of company stock).
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because they cannot receive the same contraception access as women
whose employers are not exempt.65 This is an issue because, as Justice
Sotomayor noted in a recent contraceptive mandate case, “[s]ome women
don’t adhere to the religious tenet of their employers and have a real need
for contraceptives.”66
In addition to those women who still face difficulties obtaining
contraceptives due to employer exemption, there are millions of women
who continue to face barriers to affordable and effective contraceptive care
from their insurance companies.67 Many women are still victims of their
insurance companies which often charge copayment for methods other than
birth control pills, require prior approval from a doctor, or simply do not
cover their preferred method of contraception.68
D. Maryland’s Contraceptive Equity Act of 2016
Maryland’s Contraceptive Equity Act (MCEA) was passed with
overwhelming bi-partisan support and is one of the more comprehensive
state contraception plans.69 The MCEA has several provisions aimed at
providing greater access to contraceptives.70 It prohibits co-payment for
most contraceptives with few exceptions.71 Additionally, the MCEA
provides coverage for up to thirteen months of birth control and eliminates
the need for a prescription in order to receive no-cost coverage of over-thecounter birth control such as Plan B.72 Lastly, the MCEA covers the cost of

65. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124 (discussing the exemptions within the
Mandate and their effects on contraception access).
66. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Zubik v. Burwell, 2016 WL 1134578
(No. 14-1418) (consolidating the religious objections of several groups of religious
employers who lost in the lower court).
67. See Access to Contraception, supra note 7 (explaining the barriers are
attributable to a variety of factors including knowledge deficits, the restrictive legal and
legislative climate, and cost and insurance coverage).
68. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (4) (2012); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d
at 265 (revealing that one purpose of the Mandate was to end the harsh gender
discrimination practices of private insurance companies).
69. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016) (receiving 138 “yeas” out of 184 votes from the General
Assembly).
70. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; see also MD. CODE ANN., INS. §
15-826.1 (enabling more comprehensive coverage and easy access to multiple birth
control methods and procedures to eliminate burdens left by the Mandate).
71. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1(e)(1)-(2).
72. See id. § 15-826.1(e)(1)(i) (providing women with more freedom in their
contraception choices).
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male sterilization procedures, including vasectomies.73 These aspects of
the plan make the MCEA the first contraceptive coverage plan to provide
contraception access to both men and women.74
III. ANALYSIS
A. Burdens Created by the Mandate Are a Violation of the
Constitutional Right of Privacy
The Mandate’s over burdensome features are not narrowly applied to
serve a compelling government interest.75 In order to protect the
constitutional right to privacy, the Mandate must be amended to better
serve the government’s interests in promoting public health and gender
equality.76 In order to better serve the government’s interests, the Mandate
should allow women to choose the method of contraception that works best
for them, regardless of cost or the presence of a prescription.77
The right to privacy has been deemed “the most comprehensive of
rights” not only because of how much the right encompasses, but also
because at its most rudimentary level, the right to privacy is essentially the
right to choose whether or not to engage in certain acts or have certain
experiences.78 The fundamental right to privacy has evolved over time to
include an individual’s decision to procreate, which inherently includes a
right to contraception.79 As a fundamental right, a woman’s right to

73. See id. § 15-826.2(a)(4).
74. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-

826.1.
75. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)
(stating that the contraceptive mandate serves a variety of important interests; however,
many of the interests are phrased in very broad terms).
76. See id. at 2770; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (providing the
constitutional standard the Mandate is required to uphold).
77. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
835 (1992) (finding that a woman’s ability to control her reproductive health directly
facilitates her ability to participate socially and economically); see also Priests for Life
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting
that providing contraceptives without cost sharing or administrative burdens is
necessary).
78. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (describing the right of privacy as protection against invasions into the
“sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life”).
79. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (defining the right to privacy
as, “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child”).
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contraception is protected by strict judicial scrutiny.80 Therefore, any
government regulation controlling contraception access or use must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.81
The Court in Roe recognized that a government regulation denying
women access to abortions would have detrimental results.82 Denying
women access to abortions results in unwanted pregnancies, which can
have damaging effects on the psychological health of both the mother and
child.83 The Court concluded that an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy
could leave the woman unprepared for motherhood and the accompanying
stress, which could have negative impacts on the mental and physical
health of all individuals involved.84 For these reasons, the Court concluded
that the government must be limited when regulating a woman’s decision
to have an abortion.85 Similarly, statutes denying women access to
contraception will also lead to an increase in unwanted pregnancies.86 The
unwanted pregnancies arising from contraception restrictions result in the
same negative effects on mothers and children as the statutes denying
abortions in Roe.87 In analyzing statutes and contraceptive coverage plans,

80. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56, 163 (creating the strict scrutiny analysis for
application in the right to privacy cases, including cases related to infringements upon
the right to receive an abortion); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479,
485 (1965) (establishing the right to contraception as fundamental and subject to
judicial scrutiny).
81. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
82. See id. (concluding that the state’s decision to deny a pregnant woman an
abortion altogether is obviously detrimental).
83. See id. (stating that unwanted pregnancies or offspring can result in a more
stressful life for the woman in the future by causing depression and anxiety, among
other mental health issues).
84. See id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (expressing that unwanted pregnancies can result in a
mother’s inability to nurture and care for the infant, which causes distress to both the
mother and offspring).
85. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (explaining that there would be a great detriment to
women and society if the state was to impose such a burden of removing her choice
altogether).
86. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229,
262 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that couples without access to contraception were eightyfive percent more likely to get pregnant than couples with access) (citing Clinical
Preventive Services for Women Closing the Gaps, INSTIT. OF MED., July 19, 2011,
https://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/ClinicalPreventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-theGaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf).
87. See id. at 261-62 (listing the negative effects of no contraception, including
pregnancy risks); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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any regulation that is created must have a compelling state interest that is
narrowly tailored and does not infringe on a woman’s right to privacy.88
Therefore, the same limitations should apply to statutes that result in
contraception restrictions that are detrimental to a woman’s right to choose
and the right to privacy, including the Mandate.89
The Court in Roe also recognized that the government possessed
legitimate interests in regulating abortions.90 Consequently, the Court
established a balancing test, intended to protect the right to privacy while
considering the government’s interests.91 When the government’s interests
become dominant, limitations on the right to privacy may be permitted to
achieve and protect those compelling government interests.92 Likewise,
similar compelling government interests have supported the Mandate, and
these interests must be narrowly tailored and balanced against the burdens
placed on women as a result of the Mandate’s restrictions.93 Although the
Mandate must comport with the Roe balancing test, it fails to comport
because it is not narrowly tailored nor does it appropriately balance the
burdens to contraception access left on women.94
During the Mandate’s inception, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) partnered with the Institute of Medicine to
determine which preventive services the Mandate should cover to create a
comprehensive plan.95
88. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (applying a balancing
test to determine if a regulation banning the sale of contraceptives was narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest).
89. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56, 164-65 (providing the strict scrutiny analysis that
should be applied to determine constitutionality of infringements upon the right to
privacy).
90. See id. at 154 (noting specific government interests for regulating abortions,
such as safeguarding an individual’s health and protecting any potential life that might
be harmed).
91. See id. (explaining that there are constitutionally sound reasons for why and
how a right to privacy in abortion might be limited and regulated).
92. See id. at 163-64 (concluding that regulations that may impede on the right to
privacy are constitutionally sound if protection of fetal life becomes necessary because
of “logical and biological justifications”).
93. See id. at 165; see also Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum.
Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 258-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reporting the government’s interests in
implementing the Mandate, including an interest in the physical health and safety of the
public); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (applying a strict scrutiny
analysis to a Massachusetts contraception regulation).
94. See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 3 (describing the barriers to
contraception access that exist despite the Mandate).
95. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 265 (describing the Mandate’s creation and
implementation); see also Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps,

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

13

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4

224

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 25:2

Throughout the Mandate’s creation, the HHS mentioned several
government interests that the Mandate is intended to serve.96 Specifically,
HHS mentioned the Mandate’s interest in protecting public health, safety,
and morals, and ensuring that all women have access to all Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved contraceptives without cost sharing.97
Throughout the Supreme Court’s history, it has considered all of these
interests compelling enough to allow regulation and infringement upon the
individual’s right to privacy, so long as they are applied narrowly.98
The government’s central interest in creating and enforcing the Mandate
was to increase the quality and access to preventative services, which was
accepted as compelling by the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby.99 HHS also
maintains that the Mandate serves the government’s interest in promoting
public health.100 The Supreme Court has continuously held in assessing the
right to privacy that the government’s interest in safeguarding the public’s
health should be considered a compelling one.101 Lastly, HHS sustains an
interest in increasing gender equality, and the Supreme Court has
considered this interest to be compelling because sex discrimination
deprives women of their individual dignity and “denies society the benefits
of wide participation in political, social and economic life.”102
INSTIT.
OF
MED.
1-2
(July
2011),
http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/ClinicalPreventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-theGaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf [hereinafter Closing the
Gaps].
96. See Closing the Gaps, supra note 95, at 4.
97. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014); see
also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 257 (concluding that the government asserted an
interest in supporting more comprehensive, cost-free access to contraceptive services).
98. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 257-61 (explaining that there are
circumstances, often pertaining to the health of the individual, in which a right to
privacy can be limited and regulated for certain state interests).
99. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (holding “[u]nder RFRA, a Government action
that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise must serve a compelling
government interest, and we assume that the HHS regulations satisfy this
requirement.”).
100. See id. at 2779 (asserting that any coverage of contraceptives adds to
promoting public health).
101. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973); see also Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944) (upholding child labor laws because
government interest in protecting the health and welfare of children was compelling).
102. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (recognizing a
compelling interest in promoting women’s equal enjoyment of leadership skills); see
also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (finding compelling the government’s interest as
an effort to eradicate lingering effects of sex discrimination).
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Although several compelling government interests support the Mandate,
this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the Mandate is
constitutionally sound.103 A constitutional issue arises with the Mandate
because of the government limitations that are consequently placed on a
women’s right to privacy.104 Even though the regulations may further a
compelling government interest, they are applied in an overly broad
manner, placing substantial burdens on a woman’s control over her right to
privacy.105 Specifically, the Mandate allows insurance companies to cover
only one FDA-approved method under each category of contraceptives,106 a
notion that is in conflict with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Planned
Parenthood.107
Even though a statute may further a compelling
government interest, if that statute has “the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice,” then it is constitutionally
burdensome.108
The Supreme Court has continuously held that the government cannot
freely further its interests at the expense of an individual’s right to privacy,
and the same standard must apply to the Mandate.109 For example, the
Supreme Court is currently in conflict with the Mandate’s regulations
through its ruling in Carey.110 Specifically, the Court in Carey invalidated
a similar statute that restricted access to contraception because several of
the statute’s provisions placed significant burdens on individuals.111 In
103. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
877 (1992); see also Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (implying that free contraception was
a compelling state interest); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 259 (holding that the
protection of the health and safety of the public supports the government’s interest in
enforcing the Mandate’s contraceptive coverage requirement).
104. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (holding that
even minor restrictions on access to contraceptives that work to significantly burden the
right to decide to have a child must also pass constitutional scrutiny).
105. See id. at 685-86; see also Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 877.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (restricting coverage for women’s
preventative care to services supported by the Health Resources and Services
Administration).
107. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 877 (ruling that any burdensome
regulation is not a permissible means of serving even a legitimate end).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 851-52 (holding that the Constitution places limits on the
government’s right to interfere with an individual’s decisions about his/her body and
his/her future); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (establishing the strict
scrutiny analysis to determine if a statute places significant burdens on individuals).
110. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 685-86 (stating that the Constitution protects
individuals to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into the decision
whether to procreate).
111. See id. at 696 (concluding that a regulation which prohibited the distribution of
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Carey, the Court invalidated a provision that prohibited the distribution of
nonmedical contraceptives to adults except through licensed pharmacists.112
The Court found that the provision “clearly burden[ed]” and limited an
individual’s decision to use contraception because not every individual
would be able to easily access a licensed pharmacist.113 Furthermore, the
Court disagreed that the provision could be justified by an interest in
protecting health as it applied to nonhazardous contraceptives.114
Similarly, the Mandate works to burden a woman’s decision to use
contraception by limiting the contraceptive options available.115 Unlike
other challenged contraception statutes, the Mandate appears to be
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest because it does not ban or
restrict access to contraception.116 However, it is unconstitutional because,
similar to the regulations in Carey, the Mandate restricts a woman’s right to
privacy by limiting access to her preferred method of birth control.117
Limiting a woman’s access to her preferred method of birth control is not
narrowly tailored enough for it to be constitutional.118 Therefore, the
Mandate should not be considered a permissible means to a legitimate end
because the barriers placed on women are not sufficiently narrow to a
legitimate end.119
The Mandate places significant barriers on a woman’s ability to access
contraceptives to those younger than sixteen years of age placed unjustifiable burdens
on young women attempting to gain access to contraception).
112. See id. at 690-91.
113. See id. at 689 (finding that restricting the distribution of contraception to
licensed pharmacists “reduces the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase,
and lessens the possibility of price competition,” both of which place a burden on
individuals seeking to purchase contraception).
114. See id. at 690-91 (concluding that “preventing young people from selling
contraceptives,” “facilitating enforcement of the other provisions of the statute,” and
“preventing anyone from tampering with the contraceptives,” were not compelling state
interests justifying infringement).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (limiting a woman’s ability to choose
her preferred method of contraceptives by limiting coverage to only methods supported
by the Health Resources and Services Administration).
116. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 685-86 (assessing the Mandate under strict scrutiny
analysis); see also id.
117. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 689-92 (concluding that limitations on the distribution
of contraceptives burden the freedom to make such decisions and are therefore
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis).
118. See id. at 686 (stating that a regulation effecting the private decision of
whether to have children requires compelling state interests that are narrowly drawn to
express only those interests); see also § 300gg-13(a)(4) .
119. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-88 (noting that restrictions on distribution of
contraception may limit a woman’s ability to choose the method that she prefers).
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and use contraception, and therefore her right to privacy, because insurance
providers are allowed to cover only one form of each approved category of
contraception.120 By restricting the contraception coverage to only one
method in each of the twenty FDA-approved categories, the Mandate
places significant barriers on a woman’s right to choose when and how to
prevent or terminate a pregnancy.121 This can result in a woman’s inability
to choose and receive the method that is going to be the best for her
body.122 This also impedes the concept that patient choice and efficacy
should be the principal factors in choosing one method of contraception
over another.123
Contraceptive methods are not interchangeable, and a dramatic
difference exists between methods depending on the product and the
woman.124 Furthermore, women who are dissatisfied with their prescribed
method are more likely to use the contraception incorrectly, inconsistently,
or sporadically.125 To combat this misuse, women need access to not just
any method of contraception, but to the “[o]ne most suitable for their
individual needs and circumstances at any given time in their reproductive
lives.”126
An additional barrier to contraception access under the Mandate can be
attributed to the fact that some insurance companies, clinics, and
pharmacies require women to “fail” at using a less expensive method
before they provide more expensive methods.127 This procedure runs
120. See id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (holding that regulations which place significant barriers to a
woman’s access to reproductive services is a violation of the right to privacy); Priests
for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 261 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(concluding that limited access to contraception can result in a woman being forced to
choose a less effective method).
121. See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 3.
122. See id. at 2-3.
123. See id. at 1-5 (noting that health care facilities and insurance providers should
focus on patient care and choice to provide comprehensive contraception care).
124. See Adam Sonfield, Rounding Out the Contraceptive Coverage Guarantee:
Why ‘Male’ Contraceptive Methods Matter for Everyone, 18 GUTTMACHER POL. REV.
34,
35
(2015),
https://www.guttmacher.org/about/gpr/2015/06/rounding-outcontraceptive-coverage-guarantee-why-male-contraceptive-methods
[hereinafter
Sonfield] (explaining why comprehensive contraception access is important to gender
equality).
125. See id. at 35; see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 265 (stating that women are
unlikely to use contraception coverage when it is costly or complicated to obtain).
126. See Sonfield, supra note 124, at 35.
127. See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that many providers
require an unsuccessful trial and error period before better and more expensive
contraception may be provided).
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counter to the government’s interest in promoting public health and
expanding access to contraceptive methods.128 To serve the government’s
interest in promoting public health, the Mandate must require coverage of
all contraception methods from the beginning, not only after cheaper
methods have proven ineffective.129
In addition, HHS revealed that even modest or less expensive copayments deter some women from purchasing contraception.130 This
causes some women who only have access to one method at no cost to
decide not to purchase an alternative better method simply because it
requires a co-payment.131 Accordingly, access to more than one method in
each FDA approved category at no cost must be provided in order to
lawfully serve the government’s interest in expanding the quality and
access to preventive care.132
Conclusively, by limiting no-cost coverage to only one method in each
FDA approved category, the Mandate places significant barriers to a
woman’s ability to control her reproductive life.133 This limitation works
against the interests proposed by the government because the restriction not
only limits women’s access to her preferred method of contraception, but
also hurts public health and welfare.134 These aspects of the Mandate are
not narrowly tailored enough even for government interests that may be
compelling.135 Therefore, the Mandate fails the strict scrutiny analysis and

128. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (finding that even minor added steps
dissuade women from obtaining contraceptives, and such obstacles fail to meet the
government’s interest in enhancing access to contraception).
129. See id. at 263 (stating that to serve the government’s interest in expanding
contraception access, the contraception must be effective).
130. See id. at 261 (resulting in women being deterred from using contraception
because the cost is too high).
131. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014)
(demonstrating that even minor co-payments deter women from receiving
contraception opposed to using the alternative and cheaper method).
132. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (restating that even minor barriers, such as
cost, deter women from receiving contraception, defeating the government’s interest in
providing comprehensive contraception access).
133. See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 2 (denying women the choice of
contraceptive method results in her inability to exercise her right to reproductive health
care); see also Sonfield, supra note 124, at 36 (noting that contraception allows people
to plan if and when to reproduce).
134. See Sonfield, supra note 124, at 36 (noting that reproductive planning enabled
by contraception access helps prevent public health issues such as premature births and
pregnancy complications).
135. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53, 155 (1973) (establishing the strict
scrutiny standard that applies here).
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should be invalidated as unconstitutional.136
B. The Maryland Contraceptive Equity Act Eliminates Those Burdens,
Becoming a More Constitutionally Sound Statute
The MCEA’s broad coverage of contraceptive options firmly uphold a
woman’s right to privacy by allowing the minimal amount of government
intrusion, while placing little to no burden on the women’s ability to obtain
the best contraceptives.137 The MCEA provides women with more options,
while eliminating a variety of barriers to actual possession of contraception
that currently exist under the Mandate.138
Unlike the Mandate, the MCEA requires insurance companies to cover
multiple contraceptive methods under each FDA-approved category at nocost.139 By requiring insurance companies to cover the costs of multiple
contraception methods, the statute expands upon the Mandate, eliminating
a huge barrier to contraception access.140 The MCEA stipulates that
employers should provide coverage for methods of contraception that are
not already covered.141 This assists women in acquiring an effective,
uncovered contraception method if the covered method has been ineffective
in treating the condition or if it has caused an adverse reaction to the
woman.142 This allows women to receive the method that works best for
them and it better serves the state’s compelling interest in safeguarding
women’s health.143 This type of coverage helps to eliminate certain
136. See id. at 153 (holding that laws criminalizing abortion are not narrowly
tailored to the government’s interest in women’s health and potential human life); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
137. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016) (providing more comprehensive contraception access
reduces burdens on women in relation to preventative care).
138. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1
(providing women with more comprehensive contraception coverage through the
elimination of almost all co-payments).
139. Compare MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; and MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-826.1, with 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (comparing the MCEA,
which covers multiple methods in each FDA approved category of contraception to the
Mandate, which permits coverage of only one method from each category).
140. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1
(allowing women to choose which contraceptive measure is right for them, not just
choosing the option that best fits with the contraceptive coverage plan).
141. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1 (expanding upon the Mandate’s coverage
of contraceptive methods).
142. See id. (expanding the access to contraceptives that are available to women
under the contraceptive plan by providing coverage of more than one method).
143. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229,
259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying the strict scrutiny test for a compelling government
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contraception barriers left by the Mandate’s requirement that insurance
companies only cover one method in each FDA-approved category.144
The MCEA also allows women to obtain up to thirteen months of birth
control at a time, which provides more security for women seeking to
prevent pregnancy.145 According to the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, a major insurance barrier to contraception access
includes “[l]imits on the number of contraceptive products dispensed.”146
Insurance plan restrictions prevent seventy-three percent of women from
receiving more than a single month’s supply of contraception at a time. 147
When combined with the fact that most women are unable to obtain
contraceptive refills on a timely basis, these dispersal restrictions place
major burdens on women who need to receive more than a one-month
supply of contraception at a time.148 As opposed to the Mandate, which
does not currently provide for long-term contraception access, the MCEA’s
thirteen-month coverage allows women to plan for their reproductive
future.149
In addition, the MCEA also requires no-cost insurance coverage of overthe-counter medications, including emergency contraceptives such as Plan
B.150 This provision helps to expand contraception coverage under the
Mandate, which currently provides no cost-coverage of strictly generic
brands.151 Often times, women need immediate and effective care when
making the decision to have a child.152 Emergency contraception allows
interest with a narrowly tailored regulation).
144. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1; § 300gg-13(a)(4).
145. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261; see also Access to Contraception, supra
note 7 (providing up to a year of contraception is cost effective and increases adherence
and continuance rates).
146. See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that the more barriers
that are placed on contraceptives, the smaller the market place for contraceptives).
147. See id. at 3 (deterring women from ordering their contraceptives because of the
inconvenience of refilling the prescription every month, as opposed to receiving
multiple months at a time).
148. See id.
149. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1; § 300gg-13(a)(4).
150. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1; § 300gg-13(a)(4) (increasing access to over-the-counter medications,
preventative, and emergency measures that are currently unavailable in the Mandate).
151. See § 300gg-13(a)(4).
152. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229,
261 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that enabling women to have more control over the time
and space of their pregnancy improves health outcomes).
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women an immediate solution when preventing unwanted or unplanned
pregnancies by preventing pregnancy up to five days after sex.153
However, these methods are often far more expensive than other methods,
and cost is one of the biggest barriers to contraception access.154 For
example, some emergency contraception methods can cost anywhere from
$60 to $900 without insurance coverage.155 For some women, the high cost
makes it virtually impossible to purchase emergency contraception and
therefore, those women are denied control over their contraception access
This high cost unconstitutionally restricts
under the Mandate.156
contraception access because it impedes on a woman’s ability to exercise
her right to privacy by limiting her ability to purchase the contraception
method she so chooses.157
Moreover, the MCEA requires insurance coverage for over-the-counter
contraception, permitting women to purchase emergency contraception
quickly and easily.158 This provision of MCEA helps to further the state’s
compelling interest in promoting and protecting women’s health and
welfare.159 By eliminating cost barriers to contraception access, the MCEA
serves the government’s interests better than the Mandate.160 The MCEA
does not place any cost burden on women who need to use an emergency
153. See Committee Opinion No. 544: Over-the-Counter Access to Oral
Contraceptives, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Dec. 2012)
https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-GynecologicPractice/co544.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20170315T2132390923 [hereinafter Over-the-Counter
Access]; see also Morning-After Pill (Emergency Contraception), PLANNED
PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/morning-after-pillemergency-contraception (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
154. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261 (asserting that some prescription methods
of contraception cost “nearly a month’s full-time pay for workers earning the minimum
wage”).
155. See Over-the-Counter Access, supra note 153; see also Morning-After Pill
(Emergency Contraception), supra note 153.
156. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (revealing that over fifty percent of
women delay or avoid preventative care because of the high costs associated with
contraception).
157. See id. (explaining that people do not prioritize or plan for using preventative
care when they are required to pay for it).
158. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016) (providing no-cost coverage for Plan B and other
contraception increases the likelihood that women will use contraception).
159. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 259 (concluding that a variety of adverse
health conditions and costly care can be evaded with access to preventative services
such as contraception).
160. See id. at 260 (finding that the elimination of co-payments for contraception
would result in an increase of its use).
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contraceptive method, as opposed to the Mandate, which permits insurance
companies and pharmacies to charge for name brands.161
Lastly, the MCEA provides no-cost coverage for male sterilization,
which further eases the burden on women.162 In contrast, the Mandate does
not currently require no-cost coverage of male vasectomies and condoms,
two preventative methods approved by the FDA.163 The absence of no-cost
coverage of male contraception in the Mandate places women and couples
at a disadvantage because the women are required to bear the burden of
contraceptive coverage, which further limits their access to contraception
by restricting their options.164 By expanding coverage to provide no-cost
contraception to men, women are no longer the sole party with access to
no-cost preventative services.165 This expansion furthers the government’s
interest in promoting public health and gender equality.166 In addition, this
provision helps to further the government’s interest in increasing social and
economic welfare by decreasing unwanted pregnancies.167 Studies show
that vasectomies are the second most effective contraceptive method, and
are therefore more successful at preventing unplanned pregnancy.168
Providing no-cost coverage of male contraception will further the
government’s interest in promoting public health by providing couples with
access to an even more effective method than those already covered by the
Mandate.169 Furthermore, providing contraception methods to both sexes

161. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1.
162. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1
(providing coverage for male sterilization provides women with a safer contraceptive
alternative).
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (lacking no-cost coverage for male
contraception).
164. See id.; see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (stating that in comparing
men and women, women pay sixty-eight percent more in out-of-pocket health care
costs than men, placing women at a significant economic and social disadvantage).
165. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (stating that reproductive and preventative
healthcare costs fail women disproportionally over men).
166. See id.; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779
(2014) (noting that an interest of the government is to promote and strengthen gender
equality through the Mandate).
167. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261 (explaining that expanding access to
contraception allows women to forgo the physical burdens and risks of pregnancy
unless they consciously make the choice to do so).
168. See Sonfield, supra note 124, at 35.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016); see also Priests for
Life, 772 F.3d at 263.
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allows the MCEA to uphold the right to marital privacy because it allows
couples to choose which partner will engage in the preventing of
pregnancy.170 Currently, approximately one-fourth of females rely on
condoms and vasectomies as their main method of contraception.171
Therefore the Mandate, unlike the MCEA, fails to provide effective no-cost
coverage for women relying on male contraception.172 This supports the
conclusion that the Mandate fails to serve the interest in providing
comprehensive contraception coverage and promoting public health.173 In
contrast, the MCEA’s coverage of vasectomies helps eliminate barriers left
by the Mandate, better serving the government’s interests.174
The MCEA provides more comprehensive coverage, passing strict
judicial scrutiny to protect individuals’ fundamental right to privacy. 175
The MCEA helps to eliminate the burdens left by the Mandate by
expanding upon the Mandate’s provisions to provide women with more
contraception options at no cost.176 The inclusiveness of the MCEA better
serves the state’s interest in safeguarding public health by providing
coverage for a broader range of preventive services.177 By providing this
broader coverage, both women and men have access to more contraceptive
methods, resulting in stronger protections for public health.178 Not only is
the MCEA more successful at promoting public welfare and increasing
contraception access, but also more compatible with the Court’s ruling that
infringements on the right to privacy must be narrowly tailored to serve

170. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (concluding that a preventative care
package that fails to cover contraception would result in unequal access to the full
range of health care services between the sexes).
171. See Sonfield, supra note 124, at 36 (choosing options that include male
participation).
172. See id. (describing the statute’s failure to the quarter of women that rely on
male coverage who are unprotected under the Mandate).
173. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (failing the strict scrutiny analysis
necessary for any infringement or regulation on the right to privacy).
174. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1.
175. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
176. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
177. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (providing coverage for emergency
contraception, male sterilization, and other preventive methods that are not easily
accessible through the Mandate’s provisions).
178. See id. (promoting the government interest that protection of public welfare is
compelling enough to support a statute regulating contraception access).
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compelling government interests.179
C. The Maryland Contraceptive Equity Act Will Survive Religious
Objection and Strict Judicial Scrutiny
State contraceptive equity laws can help to close the gaps left by the
Mandate by providing even more comprehensive contraception
coverage.180 However, many of these statutes contain religious exemptions
similar to the exemptions provided for by the Mandate.181 Specifically, the
MCEA contains a religious exemption that allows religious organizations
to request exclusion from contraception coverage.182 The MCEA religious
exemption stipulates that religious organizations may request exclusion if
the required coverage conflicts with the religious organization’s “bona
fide” religious beliefs and practices.183 The exemption also requires
religious employers that obtain an exclusion to provide their employees
with reasonable and timely notice of the exclusion.184 The religious
exemption can reduce contraception access by restricting no-cost coverage
to women who are employed by religious organizations but may not share
the same religious objections.185
State contraception laws often garner the same religious criticism
received by the Mandate.186 For example, in 2004, several Catholic groups
challenged the religious exemption contained in California’s Women’s

179. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (governing right to privacy infringements and the
restrictions that may or may not be placed on the right to privacy).
180. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1 (providing an example of a comprehensive state contraception equity law).
181. See § 300gg-13(a)(4).
182. See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c) (allowing religious organizations that
provide coverage to be exempt from providing their employees with contraceptive
coverage in their plans).
183. See id. (the statute’s broad language does not explicitly specify what qualifies
as a “bona fide” religious belief).
184. See id. (explaining the statute’s broad language does not explicitly specify
what qualifies as “reasonable and timely notice”).
185. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229,
265 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that there are millions of Americans that work for
religious nonprofits but do not share the organization’s beliefs).
186. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court of Sacramento City, 10
Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 290 (2004) (challenging the constitutionality of California’s
Women’s Contraception Equity Act); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio,
859 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 2006) (challenging the constitutionality of New York
Women’s Health and Wellness Act).
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Contraception Equity Act (WCEA).187 These groups claimed that the
statute forced the religious organizations to either refuse to provide health
insurance coverage for its employees or facilitate the sin of contraception,
both of which violated the organization’s religious beliefs.188 The
California Supreme Court upheld the WCEA, applying a strict scrutiny
analysis to conclude that the statute did not impermissibly impair the
religious rights of Catholic Charities.189 Although a strict scrutiny analysis
is not required for a state’s contraception equity statute to withstand a
religious objection, several courts have applied this standard.190 Under this
standard, a law cannot substantially burden a religious belief or practice
unless it can be shown that the law used the least restrictive means to
achieve a compelling interest.191
As previously stated, the religious exemption contained in the Mandate
has been challenged by multiple religious organizations, and in these cases,
the Court has applied a strict scrutiny analysis under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.192 Specifically in Hobby Lobby, the Court concluded that
the Mandate did not satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis because the Mandate
substantially burdened the religious practice of for-profit corporations and
did not satisfy the least-restrictive-means requirement.193 The Court
concluded the government could achieve its goals through less restrictive
means because it has already done so through its accommodations to other
religious non-profit organizations.194
187. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 290.
188. See id. at 290-91 (arguing that notifying the government of their exemption

facilitated the way contraceptives are provided).
189. See id. at 315 (concluding that no less restrictive alternative exists because
“any broader exemption increases the number of women affected by discrimination in
the provision of health care benefits”).
190. See id. (choosing to apply strict scrutiny analysis because no interpretation of
the free exercise clause of California’s Constitution existed at the time).
191. See id. (applying a strict scrutiny analysis similar to the judicial scrutiny
applied to infringements upon fundamental rights).
192. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado v.
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2014); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d
1114, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) (requiring “the government to demonstrate that mandating
a plaintiff’s compliance with the objected-to requirement is the least restrictive means
of advancing a compelling interest”).
193. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014)
(finding that the Mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion when applied
to for-profit, closely-held corporations).
194. See id. at 2757-58 (concluding that a less restrictive method would require the
“[g]overnment [to] assume the cost of providing the contraceptives at issue to any
women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their
employers’ religious objections”).
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Alternatively, applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the MCEA leads to
the conclusion that the MCEA will withstand religious scrutiny if
challenged.195 Unlike the Mandate, which explicitly did not provide an
exemption to for-profit religious corporations, the MCEA provides the
opportunity for an exemption to any religious organization.196 The MCEA
contains a broader exemption, helping to eliminate the unconstitutional
religious burdens created by the Mandate’s limited religious exemption.197
Under the MCEA, no religious organization should be faced with a
religious burden or ethical dilemma because the language provides an
exemption for any organization with a genuine religious belief.198
To defeat religious objection, the MCEA must be supported by
compelling state interests.199 Several government interests, including
increasing access to contraception and protecting public health and welfare,
support the MCEA.200 Similarly, identical government interests support the
Mandate, and the Court has concluded that these interests are compelling
for the purposes of the government’s intrusion into religious practice.201
Therefore, it is safe to assume the MCEA religious exemption will satisfy
the compelling interest requirement of a strict scrutiny analysis because the
interests are identical to the compelling interests achieved by the
Mandate.202
For the MCEA’s religious exemption to withstand judicial scrutiny, the
government must also show that the statute achieves its compelling
interests through the least-restrictive means.203 The MCEA succeeds in

195. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016) (narrowly tailoring restrictions to the right to privacy to
promote more access to contraceptives and public welfare).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)(2012); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c).
197. See § 300gg-13(a)(4); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (2016); MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1.
198. See § 300gg-13(a)(4); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (2016); MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1.
199. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court of Sacramento City, 10
Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 315 (2004) (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to determine the
validity of religious objections to state contraception statutes).
200. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826.1.
201. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)
(assuming the interest in guaranteeing no-cost access to contraceptive methods is
compelling within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
202. See id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 15-826.1.
203. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (detailing the requirements under strict
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achieving the government’s interests through the least restrictive means
because it provides an accommodation to all religious employers with
“bona fide” religious beliefs.204 This accommodation is counter to the
Mandate’s religious exemption, which fails to satisfy the least-restrictive
means requirement because it grants religious accommodations to certain
religious organizations but not others.205 Furthermore, the MCEA satisfies
this requirement by providing contraception coverage in the leastrestrictive means possible, unlike the Mandate.206 When analyzing the
Mandate’s religious exemption, the Court found that by restricting the
religious exemption to only exemptions for non-profit religious
organizations that the regulation resulted in a statute that was underinclusive.207 Because the Mandate does not provide an exemption to all
religious organizations, the statute substantially burdens those
organizations that are not religious non-profits.208 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the Mandate’s religious exemption fails the least-restrictive
means test.209 On the other hand, the MCEA allows for a broad exemption,
which will satisfy the least-restrictive means test, because it provides an
accommodation for all reasonable religious affiliations.210
To accommodate religious beliefs while furthering the state’s interest in
protecting and promoting women’s health, the MCEA religious exemption
applies to all religious organizations with a legitimate belief.211 This helps
scrutiny analysis of religious exemptions).
204. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826(c).
205. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826(c) (finding that the Mandate, as applied to for-profit, closely-held corporations,
failed to satisfy the least restrictive means requirement).
206. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826(c) (providing an accommodation to religious organizations regardless of whether
they are a for- or non-profit organization); see also Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (holding
that the government had other means of achieving its goal without imposing a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties in these cases).
207. See generally Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (finding that the Mandate provided an
accommodation to some religious organizations but not others.)
208. See id. at 2785 (pointing out that the government has previously demonstrated
that it has an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund
contraceptive methods that impinge upon their religious beliefs).
209. See id. (finding that the government has the ability to achieve its interests
through less restrictive means and therefore, the more restrictive method is
constitutional).
210. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826(c).
211. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826(c) (providing broad language that does not include a definition for “bona fide”
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satisfy the least-restrictive means test required by the statute because it
appears the government lacks other means to achieve both of these goals.212
The MCEA’s constitutionally sound religious exemption further helps to
fill the gaps left by the Mandate.213 The MCEA better serves the
government’s interest in ensuring comprehensive contraception coverage
while providing legitimate religious organizations with an accommodation
that does not infringe upon the organization’s free practice of religion.214
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that the Mandate has increased contraception access in
the United States, it has been unsuccessful in eliminating all of the barriers
to contraception.
In contrast, many states have begun enacting
comprehensive contraception laws that help remove unconstitutional
barriers left by the Mandate. The MCEA is the strongest of these state
statutes, providing more constitutionally comprehensive coverage than the
Mandate. The MCEA fulfills the compelling governmental interest
requirement necessary for the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test by
helping protect public health and welfare, eliminating gender
discrimination, and providing preventative services at no cost to women.
By providing no-cost coverage for almost all contraception methods, as
well as male sterilization, the MCEA fills the gaps left by the Mandate
while providing a strong guideline for other states’ contraception equity
acts to follow. By eliminating the burdens left by the Mandate, the MCEA
serves as the most effective statute in upholding the constitutional right to
privacy through narrowly tailored means.

beliefs).
212. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15826(c).
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c) (providing a broad exemption helps to
accommodate religious beliefs in the least restrictive means, eliminating the Mandate’s
infringements upon certain religious organization’s beliefs).
214. See § 300gg-13(a)(4); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE
ANN., INS. § 15-826(c).
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